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Abstract ​If the cultural variations concerning knowledge and research on ordinary           
reasoning are part of cultural history, what kind of historiographical method is needed             
in order to present the history of its evolution? This paper proposes to introduce the               
study of theories of reasoning into a historiographic perspective because we assume            
that the answer to the previous question does not only depend of internal controversies              
about how reasoning performance is explained by current theories of reasoning.           
Ordinary reasoning is a historical and cultural phenomenon but it is not clear what kind               
of historiographic perspective may be coherent (in relation with its research object) or             
even necessary (in relation with possible laws exhibit by this object of research). It may               
be possible to understand natural language as a kind of opportunity for calculus. This              
article argues that this was, at least, the point of view of Alfredo Deaño. We contend                
that for Deaño, this kind of optimism is not based on the application of classical logic,                
but on linguistics and on non-classical logics. To justify this, we put forward and              
describe some or the characteristic findings of Deaño's work relating to ordinary            
reasoning (e.g., the spontaneous use of reasoning, the political similies in the            
relationship between logic and philosophy).  
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 1 Everyday  human’s  reasoning  as  style  of  reasoning  
While with the term ‘reasoning’ an intelligent sequential processing                 
of transition in thought is defined [1], with the expression ‘ordinary                     
reasoning’ two complex characteristics of everyday human reasoning are                 
frequently alluded: (i) that people restructure and transform thoughts (and                   
information), and (ii) that people make inferences through defeasible                 
reasoning  which  is  a  type  of  non-demonstrative  reasoning.  
To carry out research on ordinary reasoning is extraordinarily                 
complex. One of the reasons why this is so is that ordinary reasoning does                           
not occur only in the brain of a person but in everyday exchanges between                           
individuals and the history of their community. The fact that research on                       
ordinary reasoning cannot be dissociated from these everyday exchanges                 
has frequently become an objection against the empirical research model                   
based on a domain-specific approach. Are the possible laws or explanation                     
types determined by material aspects of the culture, the history or even the                         
folk-epistemology of a community or not? Is that also the case of the                         
validation criteria or even that of the theoretical stabilisation processes that                     
we  identify  with  ordinary  reasoning?  
The study of cultural variations with which knowledge can be                   
understood, as well as our presumed competence to reason about it, cannot                       
be undertaken without a specific historiographical model that allows the                   
more or less specific presentation of our conceptions about the history of                       
reasoning. Historicizing the style of reasoning called ‘everyday reasoning’                 
while accepting the assumptions of historical epistemology allows the                 
introduction of objects, propositions, laws and even types of explanation in                     
the historiographical debate. If the cultural variations concerning               
knowledge and research on ordinary reasoning are part of cultural history,                     
what kind of historiographical method is needed in order to present the                       
history of its evolution? Answering this question is not simple. It is also                         
unprecedented. In spite of that, it is crucial to be able to present the cultural                             
phenomenon  called  ‘reasoning’  as  a  historiographical  fact.  
Research on ordinary reasoning is usually organised following               
criteria related to the evolution of the disciplines and trends that have                       
analysed and proposed theories of reasoning. As a consequence, what                   
frequently determines what the object of investigation is or how the                     
theories of reasoning or even everyday inference itself are defined is (a) the                         
disciplinary context and the debates related to trends (i.e., cognitive                   
psychology; naturalized epistemology; cognitive anthropology, etc.); (b) the               
effect of the accumulation of conceptual analyses and its determining effect                     
(e.g., inferentialism; belief change; counterfactual reasoning; evolutionary             
approaches; tacit epistemology; computational explanation of everyday             
reasoning, etc.); (c) the programmatic perspectives adopted in research on                   
 
 
ordinary reasoning classified as the componential approach, the rules or                   
heuristics approach, and the mental models approach. Therefore, it can be                     
stated that the search for a historiographical model that suits the analysis of                         
ordinary  reasoning  evolution  is  a  secondary  matter.  
The latter perspective, that has to do with the genesis and evolution                       
of the history of reasoning and the properties of inferences, is frequently                       
identified with (and reduced to) the study of cultural difference and the                       
different thought systems—a paradigmatic example of this would be the                   
study by Nisbett et al. [19] about holistic versus analytic cognition. There is                         
no doubt that the results of the research by Nisbett et al. would support the                             
thesis that was presented in the initial pages of this article—that ordinary                       
reasoning is a historical and cultural phenomenon. Nevertheless, these                 
results also reveal the pertinence of asking about which historiographic                   
perspective may be coherent or even necessary in order to study this                       
cultural  and  social  phenomenon.  
Everything seems to point out that, in order to obtain more detailed                       
responses to how and why the agents came to be as they are, it is necessary                               
to carry out research on people’s default positions. And such a research                       
includes the challenge of discussing what historiographical model is the                   
best suited to undertake a cultural history of everyday reasoning evolution.                     
In the following pages it is argued that several principles found in Deaños’s                         
ordinary reasoning conception are relevant in order to justify a                   
historiographic  perspective  on  everyday  reasoning  research. 
2 Language  as  stimulus  to  calculus   
From Alfredo Deaño's Introducción a la lógica formal [5], it can be                       
inferred that its author maintained that natural language might be seen as a                         
source of stimuli to which calculus could be applied. It may be possible to                           
understand natural language – so to speak – as a kind of opportunity for                           
calculus. Interpretations such as that of Harada [15] state that, in this                       
regard, the optimism shown by Deaño (as correct as it was precocious, if we                           
note the date at which it was put forward, and cross-reference it with the                           
scientific work which would come, years later, to corroborate its rationality)                     
is not based – at least not principally – on the use of classical logic, but on                                 
linguistics and non-classical logics. Proof that this interpretation is correct                   
is found in remarks about, and descriptions of, fuzzy logic, made by Deaño                         
himself, and in his characteristic analysis of the inferential relations                   
between statements about fuzzy sets. However, his assertions can be fully                     
explained, and allow us to better discern the philosophical motivations of                     
their author, when we look at the internal development of his thinking, as                         
he himself outlined it, on what we will call the three fundamental findings                         
on  ordinary  reasoning:  
 
 
 
 
● The  prismatic  structure  of  communication 
● Political  similes  in  the  relationship  between  logic  and  philosophy 
● The  spontaneous  use  of  reasoning  
 
The first feature he attributes to the practice of communication is                     
‘its prismatic structure’ [6]. With this feature, Deaño is pointing out that the                         
study of human communication can only be undertaken through an                   
interdisciplinary approach. Accordingly, he assigns the task of               
accompanying the properly philosophical investigation into informative             
communication to at least four scholarly disciplines: linguistics,               
information theory, psychology, and sociology. This preliminary             
consideration acquires with Deaño the status of a programmatic principle of                     
his philosophy, and is inspired by the conviction he shares with Javier                       
Muguerza [18] that ‘language is not a simple instrument for communication,                     
but rather its sine qua non, and, thereby, the sine qua non of all informative                             
communication... When I say that language is the condition sine qua non of                         
all informative communication, I mean that it is so for the objectivity of the                           
knowledge that supports that information.’ In keeping with the                 
interdisciplinary character and ideal that it seems must preside over any                     
investigation of informative human communication (in contrast to artistic                 
communication where, as José Luis López Aranguren insisted, the                 
communication and the message seem to be one and the same thing),                       
Deaño  summarizes  this  prismatic  structure  in  the  following  findings:  
 
(i) Thought and the use of language must be conceived of as two                         
parts  of  a  single  process  [24].  
(ii) The organization of a language can only be explained if it is                         
considered an instrument of communication in the service of a human                     
group  [12].  
(iii) The unity of thought and the use of language has a discrete                         
origin,  and  divergence  only  arises  through  human  social  development.  
(iv)  Language  is  the  indispensable  vehicle  of  thought.  
 
Undoubtedly, this prismatic structure could continue to be               
illustrated by new fundamental assertions about informative             
communication, but all of them would derive from the aforementioned                   
disciplines; and demonstrating this suffices for the purpose of showing the                     
sense in which such a structure is prismatic. Deaño considers the above                       
findings sufficient on their own for another reason: they can give an idea of                           
the interdisciplinary character of a philosophical investigation into               
communicative or informative language. Proof of this lies in the fact that                       
the principal philosophical problems regarding language (e.g.             
communicative or informative language) can be reduced to the following                   
 
 
three, meaning that, when all is said and done, consideration of the findings                         
would have provided the philosopher with the necessary speculative return                   
by  demonstrating  the  need  for  the  following  three  research  questions: 
 
● Which is preferable: constructing precise artificial languages, or               
establishing  the  actual  functioning  of  natural  language?  
● Is  it  possible  or  desirable  to  unify  language? 
● Which philosophical method is the most profitable or most useful                   
speculatively: the rational reconstruction of language, or the               
description  of  its  ordinary  use?  
 
The way I see it, from the texts analysed, it can be inferred that                           
these questions (those in which the philosopher must make an effort to                       
collaborate scientifically with the other disciplines mentioned) are not only                   
the speculative result of the prismatic structure of communication, but are a                       
co-cause  of  it.  
3 Political similes in the relationship between logic and               
philosophy  
When defining the relationship between logic and philosophy,               
Deaño remarks, in a seemingly anecdotal way, that it is plural, or even that                           
there are several,and moreover, lends itself to the use of political similes.                       
The writer himself expressed this idea as follows: ‘Using political similes, we                       
would say that the relationship between logic and philosophy has moved on                       
from more or less paternal authoritarianism (in Frege and Russell), to                     
dictatorship (in early Wittgenstein), from this on to formal democracy                   
(logical positivism), from formal democracy to anarchy (latter               
Wittgenstein), and from this, finally, to bipartisanship (the philosophy of                   
ordinary language).’ Afterwards, Deaño adds something else to describe the                   
political slant of his own proposal, which he identifies, without the slightest                       
hesitation,  in  just  one  word:  ‘self-management’  (autogestión)  [6].  
We will not offer here any reconstruction of the panorama of such                       
relations put forward by Deaño, nor of the aspects of them that might be                           
interpreted in order to produce the arguments through which the political                     
similes listed might be understood (similes which, in any case, stand as                       
self-evident and immediately comprehensible.) A superficial interpretation             
of them might lead us to suppose that the author is making use of a                             
pedagogical form to effect a genuine reasoned exposition of the stages of                       
philosophy of language that is already given by the authors mentioned                     
themselves.  
It may be more interesting, however, to venture our own                   
interpretation of Deaño's position, the political thrust of which lies behind                     
the progressive character of his presentation of earlier political forms in the                       
 
 
history of the philosophy of language. The term ‘self-management’ does not                     
appear in the document again, but it can be identified with the support                         
Deaño showed for the approach taken by Noam Chomsky, who stands out                       
for the creative aspect he attributes to language, or to put it more                         
appropriately, for the radical creativity of language that he associates with                     
the use of generative rules, and in particular with the use of rules of                           
recursion, which allow us to progressively widen the expressivity of our                     
thought.  
The speaking subject seems to have assimilated a coherent system                   
of rules which permit him to realise semantic interpretations of a                     
potentially infinite number of phrases in real language. It is generative                     
grammar that Deaño has in mind when he uses the term ‘self-management’                       
to describe his particular political simile as he searches for the relationship                       
between logic and philosophy. Self-management seems to be the most                   
honest option, if we realize, like Deaño, that ‘logic has hypnotized us.                       
Obsessed by its sublime profundity, by its precision, we look for a                       
logically-perfect language, and, when we use it to analyse ordinary                   
language, we believe we find, beneath the imperfections (...) its hidden                     
essence.’  [6].  
These political similes are evidently significant, and connote               
piercing insight if we think of all the politically-driven investigations which                     
would later be carried out not only into the history of philosophy, where the                           
elemental historiographical constraints of the subject give an idea of how                     
fruitless is the attempt to evade the influence of political activity on                       
historical research, but also in disciplines like analytic social epistemology                   
(e.g., Alvin Goldman), if not in social and political epistemology (e.g., Steve                       
Fuller).  
Earlier examples of political similes can also be found in Deaño's                     
work, with not only a pedagogical, but a philosophical function, such as in                         
the following statement: ‘Far from trying to harmonize logic and dialectic,                     
Adorno, Marcuse and in general what is known as the 'Frankfurt school'                       
come to argue plainly that the 'consequence of the self-critique of logic is                         
dialectics'. Dialectics – negative, critical thinking – is constituted as a                     
critique of formal logic, the established logic, the logic of domination.’ [8].                       
Two years later, in Revista de Occidente [9], Deaño would write some clearly                         
pertinent keys to understanding the matter of the relationship between                   
analysis and dialectics (a relationship that underlies the comments in the                     
quote above). The most reliable interpretation of the reasons why Deaño's                     
interest was aroused by the distinction between analytical and dialectical                   
logic is still that formulated by Gustavo Bueno. According to him, this                       
distinction was at its height during the Cold War, in the years when the                           
Communist Bloc (along with its satellite countries) was characterised by its                     
interest in works of dialectical logic, whereas in contrast, the countries                     
belonging  to  the  capitalist  sphere  turned  to  analytical  logic.  
 
 
Taking as a starting point that astute insight regarding the                   
influence exercised by geopolitics on the historiographical distinctions               
which transcend this simple plane, and acquire – gradually, and sometimes                     
covertly – the level of philosophy, Bueno recalled the above mentioned                     
issue of Revista de Occidente specifically because it was edited by Deaño                       
himself. In its pages, the philosophers in Spain were divided into two                       
groups: the analytical and the dialectical. This division would also give                     
names to two methods (i.e., the analytical method, and the dialectical                     
method). Considering the opposition between analytical and dialectical               
logic, which was based on the idea that the former was insufficient, and that                           
it was therefore necessary to produce a dialectical logic, Bueno wondered:                     
‘What criteria can be followed in order to distinguish this supposed                     
distinction?  
The most widely followed criterion was surely that of contradiction:                   
analytical logic does not admit contradiction, whereas dialectical logic                 
accepted the principle of contradiction. But this distinction is absurd,                   
because contradiction can have no place in any logical treatise, or in any                         
ordinary discourse.’ [3]. To complement this view, one cannot but recall that                       
in his posthumously-published book, Las concepciones de la lógica, Deaño                   
would insist on the necessity of putting forward a reconstruction of the                       
history of the discipline with an eye to its possible introduction into the                         
curriculum of the Spanish universities of the time, but without, in so doing,                         
forgetting the task of advancing arguments on the function that logic must                       
have in any philosophical investigation [10]. He is still worth consulting on                       
the role of that edition in the question of the reception of analytical                         
philosophy  in  Spain  [2].  
On this latter point, Muguerza gives the definitive interpretation of                   
Deaño's philosophy, understanding it as a study of the principles on which                       
the notion of implication between utterances is based. An investigation                   
which would lead unequivocally – in this case – towards a kind of                         
transcendental reflection. The closing lecture given by Muguerza in 1978 at                     
the Jornadas de Filosofía (Philosophy Conference) as a homage to the                     
philosopher from Lugo was based on the explanation of this interpretation                     
of Deaño's thought. This event took place in the Colegio Mayor Isabel de                         
España; it started on 11 April, 1978, and was brought to a close by                           
Muguerza's magisterial lecture on 26 April. The young pro-democracy                 
newspaper El País that had appeared in 1976, just a few months after                         
Franco’s death, reviewed the event [25]. Deaño was a regular contributor                     
and reviewer of this newspaper’s culture and philosophy pages that also                     
published  several  articles  [26]  after  his  dramatic  and  premature  death.  
The quintessential insight of journalist Javier Pradera's account of                 
Deaño's personality and intellectual contribution is perhaps best captured in                   
the following statement: ‘... he displayed, through the example of his work                       
and his life, the best attributes of men of ability: intellectual rigour, a                         
 
 
certain iron perspective, a thoroughgoing refinement, and theoretical               
imagination.’ [21] Equally moving and powerfully expressive are the words                   
of Mariano Antolín Rato: ‘Deaño had a Galician father, and he was an                         
astonishing genius, the most intelligent person I have met. Throughout                   
college and university, he gained the top grade in every subject, including                       
Religion, Physical Education, and National Spirit Training. And he did not                     
study much more than his companions, because at that time, he was also                         
writing plays.’ [22] Likewise worthy of note is the homage offered to the                         
Galician philosopher by the Sociedad Asturiana de Filosofía in 1978 at the                       
Universidad de Oviedo where he studied. The event was given over to the                         
exploration of one of the relationships that most interested Deaño, as we                       
shall see later: the dilemma inherent in the relationship between logic and                       
psychology. A decisive element of that exploration was the collaboration                   
between Deaño and Juan Delval Merino [11], a specialist in evolutionary                     
psychology and education, a student of Jean Piaget's, and a philosopher by                       
training, whose approach was surely of enormous interest to Deaño, and                     
made  a  great  impression  on  him.  
Years later, the review El Basilisco would dedicate several pages by                     
José Antonio López Brugos to a comprehensive reconstruction of the                   
arguments used by Deaño to show in what sense logical laws would appear                         
to  be  the  laws  of  the  formal  constitution  of  the  transcendental  subject  [17].  
4 The  spontaneous  use  of  reasoning  
In his introduction and definition of non-classical logics of 1976,                   
Alfredo Deaño drew attention in an original way to the difference between                       
form  and  content  in  reasoning  when  he  stated:  
 
‘Distinguishing between the content and the form of an act                   
of reasoning, formal logic – hence the qualifying adjective –                   
abstracts from the content and retains only the form. And it busies                       
itself with studying these forms of reasoning, those modes of                   
argumentation, these patterns of inference, which are valid per se                   
(that is to say, by virtue of their structure, since that is all they                           
have). In what has just been said there lies implicit the reason why                         
logic uses, instead of ordinary language, that symbolic language                 
which bewilders the bewildered, and serves as a tool for those who                       
are not. Logic operates by separating form from content, and                   
subsequently retaining the former. And the thing is that, in ordinary                     
language, form and content always occur together: when we reason                   
in the world – and not in a logic class – we reason in a particular                               
way and about particular content. Form never appears on its own;                     
rather,  it  is  always  incorporated  in  a  particular  matter.  
For this reason, if logic wishes to operate on pure form, it                       
 
 
cannot do it using ordinary language: it needs an artificial language,                     
especially constructed to reflect logical form in isolation –                 
separately from all concrete content, but without thereby forgetting                 
that in fact, in the spontaneous use of reasoning, that form always                       
appears giving shape to some content. Put another way: form                   
dispenses with – it abstracts – specific content, not the idea of                       
content.’  [7].  
 
This fragment, dedicated to explaining the sense in which the                   
content and form of a piece of reasoning are an object of analysis for formal                             
logic, gives us an idea of the importance Deaño attributed to what he called                           
‘the spontaneous use of language’. According to Deaño, in this use, form is                         
always such inasmuch as it relates to some content, and therefore ‘always                       
appears giving form to some content.’ It is often said that through ordinary                         
reasoning we are able to adopt or assume new beliefs, starting from others                         
we already have. But ordinary reasoning shows us one even more defining                       
feature: through it, we can not only accumulate new beliefs, but also affect                         
processes of transformation and retraction of previously accumulated and                 
accepted beliefs, information and knowledge. This phenomenon proves               
definitive because in it we see that the inferential rules which explain the                         
adoption of new beliefs allow us to act with them in sporadic and temporary                           
ways, which is why it is often said that human reasoning is clearly                         
suppositional.  
This aspect of inferential rules really attracted Deaño's attention,                 
and is an underlying element not only of the preceding description of the                         
spontaneous use of reasoning, but of characteristic aspects of his thought,                     
which foreseeably, had it been possible, would have continued to develop as                       
part of the line of investigation that he was set on exploring. And it is in this                                 
sense that we should understand his criticism of Rudolf Carnap's principle of                       
tolerance, which he found ‘repressive’ in its first formulation, since if                     
language is neither fixed, nor a given (after all, we find ourselves                       
permanently in a position of self- management of it and of ourselves when                         
we explore what we are through informative communication), we are led to                       
the idea that the most deep-rooted aspect of it is none other than the                           
constant activity of linguistic and philosophical clarification and creation in                   
which we find ourselves immersed, as well as to an appreciation of the                         
potential  scholarly  worth  of  that.  
Thus, the first formulation of that principle seemed repressive to                   
him since it appeared to indicate that, although we enjoy complete freedom                       
in the use of language, that freedom could lead the speaker to                       
meaninglessness and logical error. Analysing Deaño, we can infer that, in                     
his judgment, those extremes have been held as undesirable (‘a form of                       
libertinism...’ - says Deaño - ‘...which in logic is associated with                     
 
 
meaninglessness’) which is why they tend to be too quickly considered as                       
though they were unproductive and even scientifically irrelevant: a serious                   
error  of  interpretation.  
Once again, a political and moral simile in the analysis of the                       
relationship between philosophy and logic, leads its author to proffer                   
unexpected criticism, which, as I see it, finds its explanation in the reasons                         
that led Gustavo Bueno to identify the galaico-asturiano (Galician-Asturian)                 
Deaño as a prominent member of what he named the Spanish philosophical                       
generation of the change (‘la generación filosófica española del cambio’),                   
with the aim of establishing a criterion of historiographical classification.                   
That generation would be succeeded by the silent generation, according to                     
Bueno. This latter aspect of reasoning to which we have alluded (i.e. the                         
relationship between form and content) constitutes the key to the                   
spontaneous use of ordinary reasoning and gives us an idea of the                       
inextricable relationship between the permanent form of content, and the                   
best interests reasoning – the true protagonist in our daily lives. And it was                           
precisely this type of reasoning which was so central for Deaño when he                         
insisted that the exaltation of ordinary language must not blind us to one of                           
its primordial characteristics, that is, that it is impossible to avoid its                       
tendency to keep developing. This very idea – which he associated on this                         
occasion with constructivism – may possibly be the key to understanding                     
the political simile of self-management in which he rooted his approach,                     
convinced as he was of the essential creativity of ordinary language and of                         
those of us who, so to speak, continuously self-manage our unrelentingly                     
autopoietic  natures.  
5 Conclusions 
At the risk of being mistaken, if we had to choose a line of                           
investigation in which Deaño's approach would not only find a reasoned                     
interpretation – in addition to a coherent accommodation –, but which also                       
allowed us to make a counterfactual forecast as to the reach his findings                         
might have attained, it would be none other than that set down by Jonathan                           
E. Adler and Lance J. Rips [1]. Reasoning is a form of non- accidental                           
transition of thought. ‘Non-accidental transition’ because the beliefs,               
information, knowledge, and so forth, provide the foundations or reasons                   
for reaching another thought. This form of transition can be predicated on                       
both theoretical reasoning (which addresses the question of whether p is the                       
case) and practical reasoning (which addresses the question of whether it is                       
the case that we must believe p). From this elemental distinction, Adler and                         
Rips elaborate a wide-ranging explanation of the history of reasoning [1].                     
Many aspects relating to their compilation (the selection of authors and                     
their backgrounds in particular disciplines, the themes, the design of the                     
index) could be used to analyse the scientific relevance of Deaño's approach.                       
 
 
Here is one example: Gilbert Harman's fundamental assertion, made in 1986                     
[15] according to which theoretical reasoning implies the activity of revising                     
the beliefs we have, but not the rules of logic or implication, is one of the                               
ideas we find in the work of Deaño. However, we can go further. Deaño not                             
only established a clear distinction between the psychological elements,                 
that of intentionality and those elements integral to the medium into which                       
inferential production in its specific epistemological projection is               
converted, he also insisted on the importance and particularity of content in                       
the ordinary formation of inferences, as well as on the characteristics of the                         
most suitable formal-logical analysis as a function of the particularities of                     
that content, the permanent substantive and/or structural modification of                 
which continuously affects the content (i.e. producing, substituting,               
modifying beliefs) but also the form (i.e., reorganizing, reinterpreting,                 
readjusting, and so forth in a different manner, and to a different degree,                         
bodies  of  belief).  
Deaño's philosophical influence seems to have continued to have a                   
clear impact on the psychology of reasoning, where his approach was                     
examined and acclaimed, for example, during a cycle of lectures,                   
‘Psychology as Science’, held at the Fundación de Investigaciones Marxistas                   
in Madrid, from 9-18 May, 1982. At that cycle, Delval dedicated his                       
dissertation to Deaño, and focused on the consequences derived from the                     
reasoning  tasks  of  Johnson-Laird  and  Peter  Wason  in  1970.  
Those three questions that Deaño posed to himself with the aim of                       
arriving at the precision tools needed to capture the secret of how ordinary                         
reasoning worked, might have been transfigured by Rips' 1975 work on the                       
psychology of reasoning and deduction [23], together with those of Nisbett,                     
Krantz, and Kunda in 1983 [19], and later, those of Carey, in 1985 [4], among                             
others. Why? Because the description of the ordinary use of reasoning                     
would have led him to wonder – along with the authors mentioned – what                           
turns a property (a piece of content) into an (inferentially) projectable                     
property? What makes a case generalizable? And multiple cases? How do                     
adults project the properties of one category of animal onto another                     
category? Does the homogeneity of categories have an effect on that                     
projection  or  transition  leading  to  the  production  of  strong  inferences?  
This latter point [14] seems to be contradictory to Deaño's interest                     
in reflecting on the possibility conditions of logic, which he located neither                       
in mental acts, nor in ideal entities, but in principles. However, it was his                           
analysis of the manner in which logic is rooted in everyday life (and in the                             
content of premises) that led him to examine the cases in which it is shown                             
that the inferences made by human subjects diverge from normative models                     
[20]. This is why Deaño insisted that logic is rooted in everyday life (real or                             
imagined),  and  did  so  using  the  analysis  of  famous  literary  extracts.  
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